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Avoiding Balancing: The Role of
Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional
Law
by
RICHARD H.

PILDE-S*

Introduction
Contemporary constitutional law presents most constitutional
conflicts as ones between individual rights and state interests. The
central role that metaphors of judicial balancing play in modern constitutional decision making emerges from organizing constitutional
conflicts in these terms. When rights and state interests, each with
their claim to legitimacy, are perceived to be in collision, we are compelled toward "weighing" the "strength" of state interests against the
"degree" of intrusion on individual rights. "Balancing" becomes the
principle technique of judicial decision.
This dominant modern technique, however, raises as many questions as it answers. How do courts "balance" seemingly incommensurable entities, such as rights and state interests? What determines the
"weight" courts assign to various state interests? How "great" must
an intrusion on individual rights be before a state interest is compelling, or substantial, or important, or legitimate enough to overcome it?
These analytical conundrums about balancing are the focus of this
Symposium.
I believe, however, that these are false problems, the artifacts of a
misleading modem understanding about the structure of many constitutional conflicts. The purported problems of balancing are not nearly
so acute precisely because-judicial rhetoric aside-balancing does
not describe the actual process operating in large areas of constitutional decision making. Contrary to the connotations suggested by the
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. Princeton University,
1979; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1983. For their contributions, I thank Fred Schauer and
Cass Sunstein. In addition, Richard Fallon provided an extremely helpful Commentary at
the Symposium, which considerably improved the final version of the Article.
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balancing metaphor, constitutional adjudication is often a qualitative
process, not a quantitative one. It is about defining the kinds of reasons that are impermissible justifications for state action in different
spheres. The Constitution recognizes numerous distinct spheres of interaction, each governed by its own logic of norms that defines the
kinds of reasons for which government can appropriately act. Constitutional adjudication (much more often than we recognize) is primarily about defining the normative structure of these different spheres.
This approach borrows from the philosophy of practical reasoning. My claim is that much of constitutional law involves what this
philosophy calls "exclusionary reasons."' These are reasons not to
act. Exclusionary reasons are preemptive, in that they categorically
rule out the reasons they exclude. Thus, exclusionary reasons are not
weighed against the reasons they exclude; rather, they prevail in such
conflicts. 2 Much of constitutional law involves this process. Rather
than balancing the strength of individual rights against the strength of
competing state interests, courts evaluate the different kinds of reasons that are off limits to government in different arenas.
To develop this argument, I propose that we re-examine a different style of constitutional adjudication, one that dominated late nineteenth-century constitutional thought. This might seem an
inauspicious place to begin, for this period is rightly viewed as planting the seeds for the reactionary constitutionalism of the Lochner era.
But we need to distinguish the substance from the methodology of
late nineteenth-century constitutional thought. The domination of
Legal Realism has been so complete that it has tainted everything associated with pre-Realist legal methods. Yet it is the very success of
this sweeping Realist critique that has led, in constitutional law, to the
conundrums of balancing.
One way out, I suggest, is to reclaim the methodology of late
nineteenth-century legal thought. This was largely a method that fo1. The concept of exclusionary reasons was first developed in JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTn(1975) [hereinafter RAZ, PRACtiCAL REASON] and elaborated in
the postscript to the second edition of this book in 1990. For critical commentary on the
concept of exclusionary reasons, see William Edmundson, Rethinking Exclusionary Reasons: A Second Edition of Joseph Raz's Practical Reason and Norms, 12 LAW & PHIL. 329
(1993); Chaim Gans, Mandatory Rules and Exclusionary Reasons 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373
(1986); Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law and Razian Reasons, 62 S.CAL. L. REV. 827
(1989); Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty, and Legal Theory, 62 S.
CAL. L. REv. 913 (1989).
2. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 190 (2d ed. 1990) ("The very
point of exclusionary reasons is to bypass issues of weight by excluding consideration of the
excluded reasons regardless of weight.").
CAL REASON AND NORMS
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cused on defining "excluded reasons" for state action in different domains. In this period, constitutional law was not as much a matter of

defining rights as of interpreting the proper justifications for exercises
of political authority. 3 Central to the American constitutional tradition is the recognition of various differentiations between separate

spheres of political authority. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court was generally concerned with defining boundary lines between
these distinct spheres of authority. From this idea flowed a specific
understanding of the techniques that legal decision making involvedcategorical reasoning and the classification of legal problems according to their proper "type." These techniques were the means of determining the reasons that are off limits to the state in different domains.

In this era, judicial analysis of constitutional conflicts thus involved two separate inquiries. First, courts defined the boundaries between distinct spheres of authority by articulating the appropriate
principles that could legitimate state action in each sphere. Second,
courts evaluated the specific governmental action in question by focusing on the principles that justified it. The paradigm for constitutional adjudication was thus the assessment of the state's justifications
for acting in light of the principles that defined the legitimate basis for
state action in the particular sphere in question.

Recapturing this method would entail understanding constitutional law as the effort to set the boundaries between separate spheres
of authority. On this view, the Constitution makes certain values appropriate bases for state action in some arenas, and other values ap3.

See 8 OWEN Fiss, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1993); MORTON J. HOROWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 11 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Histori-

cal Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc'Y 3, 10-11 (1980). The displacement of this vision
during the twentieth century is by now a familiar story. In doctrine, categorical reasoning
was supplanted by the emergence of balancing tests in which competing interests were
weighed against each other to determine where "the public good" might lie. This process
began roughly around 1910. See Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought,
90 MICH. L. REv. 1520, 1532 n.30 (1992) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE (1990)) [hereinafter Pildes, Conceptions of Value]. Legal Realism continued
this transformation by demanding that legal norms be justified in terms of the social consequences they produce and the underlying functions they serve. As judicial decision making
came under greater analytic scrutiny, courts developed multi-factor decision formulae to
lend at least what appeared to be a more rigorous structure to the balancing of interests.
At the same time, judicial inquiry into governmental purposes came under attack as too
uncertain and unsteady a foundation for decision. Sometimes the Court would disclaim
inquiry into purpose while seeming to rely on it sub rosa to invalidate legislation. Even
when the Court explicitly evaluated purposes, it was often in the face of dissenting
reprimands.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45 .

propriate in other arenas. A central task of constitutional law would
be to define the principles that give structure to these different
spheres of political authority and to measure state action against those
principles. This view requires courts to admit openly the relevance of
judicial inquiry into the reasons or purposes behind state action. For
the primary means through which courts police the boundaries between separate spheres of authority is by determining whether government's reasons for acting are consistent with the kind of reasons
that make acts of political authority in a particular sphere legitimate.
A focus on defining "excluded reasons" will not completely eliminate balancing. Constitutional adjudication, like practical reasoning
more generally, has at least two forms.4 The more familiar is one in
which there are reasons for and against taking a certain action. In the
face of such conflicting reasons, we must decide which reasons are
stronger and override the others. Genuine clashes between individual
rights and state interests take this form; for these problems, we must
confront the conundrums of balancing and resolve them in some other
way.5 But this Article emphasizes the other context, in which decisions are made by recognizing that certain reasons are simply excluded from being acceptable bases for action. It is surprising to
discover how many constitutional conflicts are most clearly resolved
through this reasoning process. Many cases that seem to require balancing of individual rights against state interests turn out instead to
require, more simply, the definition of excluded reasons. The best account of these cases is that courts today, like their counterparts in the
late nineteenth century, are primarily interpreting the constitutional
logic that defines the boundaries between separate spheres of political
authority. When this method is at work, the problem of balancing is
dissolved.
That this is the actual process of much constitutional adjudication
is obscured by the rhetoric of fundamental rights, heightened scrutiny,
and balancing. This rhetoric portrays the rights/state interests conflict
as the central dynamic of constitutional law. The prevalence of this
conception might stem from procedural and substantive legal conventions, such as standing doctrines, that lead cases to be framed in terms
4. See RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 1. at 25-48.
5. I have offered my views on how we should reconceptualize the task of rational
judicial choice amidst the seeming incommensurabilities of "rights" and "state interests."
See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,and DemocraticPolitics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990);
Pildes, Conceptions of Value, supra note 3. For similar views, see Frederick Schauer, A
Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REv. 415 (1993).
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of individualized rights-violating harms. From defining the problem in
terms of individualized claims, it is but a small step to conclude that
claims of this sort must be balanced against the state justifications for
infringing them. But the constitutional problems I will address here
do not require balancing the burdens on individual rights to see if sufficiently weighty state interests justify them. Instead, the problems
entail defining the competence or authority of the state in different
arenas.
I will sketch this alternative approach in three stages. First, Part I
revisits the history of political ideas underlying American liberalism
and the Constitution to emphasize certain central, but neglected,
strands of thought. My goal in this Part is to recapture a fuller sense
of the differentiation of political authority that is crucial to liberalism
and the Constitution. By differentiation, I mean the strategy of recognizing distinctions between the norms governing legitimate state action in different arenas (including the very distinction between state
actions and other actions, such as private ones). Differentiation, I argue, means that certain reasons are appropriate bases for public action
in some spheres, while other reasons are excluded. Part II suggests
how constitutional adjudication might be influenced by more direct
attention to the vision of differentiation underlying the Constitution
and what the proper role of rights is under such a vision. Finally, Part
III looks at specific examples of contemporary constitutional law in
disparate areas such as public education, religion, voting rights, government-funded research, and unconstitutional conditions. I hope to
show that, at least for large areas of constitutional law, balancing appears inevitable only under a misleading understanding of the constitutional reasoning process. If we focus instead on the central role of
"excluded reasons," constitutional law would become less a matter of
rights versus state interests and more a matter of defining the boundaries on political authority in different areas. The need to balanceand the concern balancing raises to its critics-would disappear.
I. The Political and Social History Thesis
Our historical understanding of the liberal republicanism underlying the American constitutional order has been greatly enriched in
recent years. The "Republican Revival" in American constitutional
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thought 6 has rediscovered the extent to which our formal political institutions were designed to foster among virtuous citizens a deliberative politics aiming at "the common good." But while the emphasis
thus far has been largely on formal political institutions, republicanism
was also, and perhaps more importantly, a complex set of social and

cultural transformations.

Most fundamentally, republicanism in-

volved a radical reinterpretation of the basis for social order in political communities. This reinterpretation involved a dramatic shift in

the way in which all authority was understood. This aspect of republicanism, and its political implications, have yet to be absorbed into
contemporary public-law thought. Recognizing the radical new vision

on which the Constitution was built can help us better grasp the point
of much of our institutional design.
In these few pages, I can offer only the thinnest account of that
history. In doing so, I draw on some of the best recent work in the

history of liberalism, in the sociological analysis of modern societies,
and in the more specific cultural and political history of the American
7
Revolution.
6. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988) (describing aspects of republicanism that have the strongest claim to contemporary
support).
7. The sources in political and social theory that have influenced me include DON
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989); STEPHEN HOLMES,
BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1984); NIKLAS
LUHMAN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen Holmes & Charles Larmore trans.,
1982); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); BERNARD YACK, THE LONGING FOR TOTAL REVOLUTION: PHILOSOPHIC
SOURCES OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT FROM ROUSSEAU TO MARX AND NIETZSCHE (1986). On

the social and political dimensions of the American Revolution, I have relied principally on
RICHARD BUSHMAN, THE REFINEMENT OF AMERICA: PERSONS, HOUSES, CITIES (1992);
STEPHANIE COONTz, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PRIVATE LIFE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN

FAMILIES, 1600-1900 (1988); GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1992) [hereinafter WOOD, RADICALISM].
In sociology, Emile Durkheim articulated the classic statement of the role of differentiation in modern societies. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
(George Simpson trans., 1933). Durkheim distinguishes the mere presence of specialized
action, which he calls "differentiation pure and simple," id. at 353, from the division of
labor that is his focus. By the latter, Durkheim means divisions that, by creating new specializations, nonetheless serve a society's "common function." Id.
Durkheim is also famous for his argument that while the division of labor in "normal"

circumstances promotes social solidarity, in "pathological forms" it produces anomie, the
antithesis of solidarity. Id. at 354-56. Durkheim identifies the principal circumstances in
which, he believes, the division of labor may become pathological. Differentiations promote solidarity by increasing the mutual interdependence of various specialized spheres,
but if these spheres are so removed that they have no interdependence, they can promote
anomie. Id. at 364-68. Also, the division of labor must be "spontaneous" and cannot be
"forced." Id. at 376. Here Durkheim invokes a naturalistic vocabulary that seeks to distin-
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Every society or political community must answer the question of
what holds it together-how it conceives of social order and social
organization. Whether this conception is articulated or tacit, every

functioning society is necessarily characterized by an implicit social
theory. Such a theory reflects an effort by people to make sense of

the world they inhabit in order to know what to do. Descriptive and
prescriptive at once, these implicit social theories are constellations of

mutually reinforcing beliefs-beliefs about physical facts, authority,
values, sources of justification, and knowledge-that structure
experience.
American understandings concerning political authority dramatically changed in the wake of the Revolution. In pre-republic
America, social and political order was thought to require a unified,
highly structured society with clearly identified, unitary sources of authority. Society was conceived as an organic whole; moral consensus
and harmony were essential. Authority flowed from the top down,
starting with the King8 and ending with the "master" of the patriarchal household. Given the organic wholeness of society, authority in
one realm metaphorically represented authority in others, so that the

family became "a little Commonwealth." 9
guish "artificial" constraints from those that correspond to "the true nature of things," but
he seems to be relying more on the force of established customs to define the "equality in
the external conditions of conflict" necessary for the division of labor to promote solidarity. See id. at 381.
8. A revealing glimpse of the social and psychological consequences in America of
monarchical authority is provided by the reactions of Benjamin Rush when he first saw the
King's throne in London in 1768. From what was to become the radically republican state
of Pennsylvania, Rush later became one of America's most ardent republicans, a signer of
the Declaration of Independence, and a figure of major political significance in the constitutional debates. Yet in 1768, he felt as if he were on "sacred ground" as he "gazed for
some time at the throne with emotions that I cannot describe." After his unusual request
to be permitted to sit upon the throne was granted, Rush described himself as "seized with
a kind of horror" as a "crowd of ideas poured in upon my mind"; he had everything anyone
could want and his "hopes aspire[d] after nothing beyond this throne." 1 LETTERS OF
BENJAMIN RUSH 68 (L. Butterfield ed., 1951). Rush, like others of the founding generation, later came to find this vision of authority repellent, see THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
BENJAMIN RUSH: His "TRAvLs THROUGH LIFE" TOGETHER WITH His COMMONPLACE
BOOK FOR 1789-1813, at 198 (G. Comer ed., 1948), but in this reversal he personally embodied the larger social transformations wrought by the American Revolution.
9. The English Puritan William Gouge expressed a view widely accepted in the colonies, particularly by those under Puritanism's influence: "'[A] familie is a little Church,
and a little Commonwealth ...whereby triall may be made of such as are fit for any place
of authoritie, or of subjection in Church or Commonwealth ....
' JOHN DEMOS, A LrrrLE
COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY epigraph (1970). The way in
which representations of authority in one arena were metaphorically conceived to replicate
authority elsewhere is reflected in the conventional maxim of the time: "Approach the
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As this metaphor suggests, pre-republic America was the antithesis of a modern, differentiated society. Instead, the implicit collective
self-understanding was that of a seamless whole, or what eighteenthcentury social thought termed the "great chain of being."' 1 Boundaries between political and social authority, or between a public and a
private realm, hardly existed. Society was conceived of as a unified
hierarchy in which everyone had his assigned place, knew his betters
and inferiors, and understood the obligations and claims that bound
people to each other within this chain."
Politics reflected and sustained this social hierarchy. Political and
social authority, for example, were perceived to legitimately coextend.
Leisure and independence, including independence from commerce
and material need, were viewed as essential preconditions to political
competence; only those who lived in such circumstances were thought
sufficiently "disinterested" to be intrusted with political power. Public
goods, such as political positions, were therefore distributed according
to the rank orderings of social position.
What is most striking about this picture is that many distinctions
we take for granted today were not part of this cultural map. Family,
society, and state were viewed as intertwined and interpenetrating; no
political and social vocabulary had yet developed for sharply distinguishing among these spheres.' 2 Hierarchical relations within the
Almighty with Reverence, thy Prince with Submission, thy Parents with Obedience, and
thy Master with Respect ....
WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 7, at 43. Blackstone,
perhaps more widely read in the colonies than in England, portrayed the King as "'pater
familias of the nation,"' making political authority personal, paternal, and analogous to
familial authority. JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER
OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 24 (1987) (quoting Blackstone). The link between familial and political authority as part of a larger organic whole was manifested in
the way the murders of masters by servants or husbands by wives were treated as different
from other murders. The former were considered petit treasons, akin to high treason, and
accordingly punished more harshly than other murders. Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Virginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 64 (1983).

10.

On "great chain of being" metaphors in eighteenth-century thought, see generally

ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF AN

IDEA 200-07 (1936).

11. In 1756, John Adams stated this in terms of the "regular and uniform Subordination of one Tribe to another down to the apparently insignificant animalcules in pepper
Water." 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 39 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961).
12. In some contemporary legal accounts, republicanism is situated quite differently
chronologically and thus interpreted in different terms, as in David Williams's perceptive

account of the role of the militia and the Second Amendment in republican thought. See
David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 585 (1991) (arguing that the militia was one manifestation
of the way republicanism "elide[d] the distinction between state and society"). Several
explanations account for this difference. First, I am interested in the contrast between
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family were viewed as necessary to maintain order in the household,
the church, and the state. As one historian has put it, "All aspects of

life were intertwined. The household, the society, and the state-private and public spheres-scarcely seemed separable. Authority and

liberty flowed not as today from the political organization of the society but from the structure of its personal relationships.' 3 Public and
private authority not only mirrored each other, but were grounded on
each other. Because of the parallel understandings about structures of

authority, obedience, and deference 14 in these areas, today's sharp
public-private distinction did not play a significant role in political and
15 Historians have described colonial life as
social justification.
"dense"' 16 in the sense that all individuals were socially and politically
defined through the interlocking roles ascribed to them on the ladder
of social order.
This was the cultural consciousness and experience of the period
Gordon Wood has recently labelled "monarchical" America.' 7 Social
order required harmony and consensus; this entailed a unified hierarchy of authority and values. Authority flowed from the top down and
horizontally across all domains; authority was continuous and identical between what we would now view as different domains. This was a
world of unity, not diversity. It was a world of tightly structured and
all-encompassing values, not pluralistic values. It was a world organrepublicanism and the preceding political and cultural consciousness of monarchicalism;
Williams is interested instead in the contrast between republicanism and the emerging philosophy of liberalism. See id. at 569-71 (arguing that the Second Amendment must be
understood in a republican, rather than liberal, light). Second, Williams focuses on the
more formal, political "institutions" of republicanism, such as the militia; I seek to describe
the broad array of social and cultural transformations associated with republicanism.
Third, Williams is interested in the relatively more subtle contrast between liberalism and
republicanism. In the broad contrast between republicanism and monarchicalism that I
stress, I use "republican" to refer to the general modernization of American political and
social order that emerged between 1776 and 1800. The differentiations I describe emerged
over this period-on some subjects more gradually than others-and my focus is this historical process of transformation over roughly 25 years.
13. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 7, at 11.
14. For an important early study of the role of deference in pre-Revolutionary culture, see J.R. Pole, Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy, 67 AMER.
HIsT. Rnv. 626, 646 (1962) ("Deference: it does not seem, in retrospect, a very secure
cement to the union of social orders. Yet to those who live under its sway it can be almost
irresistible.").
15. See CooNrz, supra note 7, at 82 (noting the "essential unity of personal and politico-economic relations in colonial life").
16. Jon Kulka, Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in
Pre-RestorationVirginia, 90 AM. His-r. Rnv. 275, 278 (1985).
17. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 7, at 11.
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ized around a sense of organic connection, not differentiation and separate spheres of authority.
Against this background, it becomes possible to appreciate what
should perhaps be considered the central achievement of the liberalrepublican tradition underlying the Constitution. After the Revolution, material, intellectual, and political pressures were beginning to
dramatically erode the grounds of political and social authority. The
question was how best to respond. The most important element of
this response was the adoption of strategies of differentiation between
different spheres of authority-the drawing of boundaries to redefine
the nature of authority and carve it up into separate spheres. These
boundaries were designed to make certain justifications for governmental action off limits in certain areas, even though the same justifications would be appropriate in other areas. Some of these
boundaries were explicitly constitutionalized; others were a function
of general social and political understandings. Most of them were
only beginning to be worked out at the time the Constitution was
adopted. We recognize several of these boundaries immediately-between state and society, public and private, church and state, and between executive, legislative, and judicial power-but we might not
fully appreciate the significance of the general vision that unites them.
This significance is that republicanism reflected the emergence of
an essentially modern conception of politics. The distinctly modern
aspect of this conception was its acceptance of the fragmentation of
authority. Republicanism abandoned social theories requiring a unified social order as the foundation for an effectively functioning
state.1 8 In their place emerged cultural and political understandings
that accepted both conflict and a less rigidly unified structure of values. This conflict and plurality of values was to be accommodated
through creating boundaries that defined different spheres in which
different values were appropriate.
The new social and political thought was expressed in the conflicting conceptions of the Anti-Federalists, who drew on more familiar and traditional conceptions of social order, and those of the
Federalists. The primary disagreement centered on the social preconditions necessary for republican political deliberation. According to
18. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
viii (1969) ("The Americans of the revolutionary generation had constructed not simply
new forms of government, but an entirely new conception of politics, a conception that
took them out of an essentially classical and medieval world of political discussion into one
that was recognizably modern.").
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the Anti-Federalists, "In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there

will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one
part will be continually striving against those of the other."' 9 According to the Federalists, whose emerging republican alternative was described by Hamilton in the Federalist,"The differences of opinion, and
the jarrings of parties in [the legislative] department.., often promote
deliberation .... "20
In embracing this conflict and adopting strategies of differentia-

tion to deal with it, republicanism emphasized three separate but related kinds of differentiation. The most familiar might be labelled
institutionaldifferentiation, or the separation between formal institu-

tions, including the institutions of political sovereignty-separation of
powers and federalism. Second, republicanism recognized differentiated realms of action, such as religion and politics or public and private realms. 21 Thus the realm of political authority was much more
sharply distinguished from social authority and from the family realm,
which was increasingly regarded as private. 22 These separations were

recognized as social constructions, rather than emanations from the
nature of things, but they were thought beneficial because they
19.

Essays of Brutus, N.Y. JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
369 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1980).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
21. Current criticism of the public-private distinction sometimes fails to take into account its historical origins and the continuing benefits of this distinction in certain contexts.
At the time, the consequences of recognizing this distinction included understandings that
the state ought not be the plaything of private powers; that public authority should not be
exploited for private gain; that public aims should be pursued through the creation of public organizations, rather than through reliance on private actors; and that individual conscience should not be intruded upon by the state. See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC
ANTI-FEDERALIST

PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN
AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 138 (1983); WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 7, at 187-89;
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 46-47

(1985). This distinction, like any other, should be criticized in particular contexts where it
is used in ways that harm individuals, but those criticisms and the changes they suggest do
not lead to the view that the distinction should be abandoned altogether. See, e.g., Frank
Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1581
(1982). It is difficult to imagine a healthy society that would not recognize some boundary
on the public sphere, even while acknowledging that boundary to itself to be socially
constructed.
22. See COONZ, supra note 7, at 154 (stating that republicanism entailed a "new family theory... [and] the attempt to distinguish paternal from governmental authority"); see
also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 20 (1985) ("Marital unions were increasingly defined as private compacts with public ramifications rather than social institutions with roles and duties
fixed by the place of the family in a hierarchical social order.").
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seemed to serve specific, valued ends. Finally, a stronger conception
of highly differentiated individualroles and accompanying responsibilities began to govern social and political understandings. Thus the impersonalization of society, as both fact and ideal, became reflected in
differentiations that directly affected individuals; personal authority,
for example, was more sharply distinguished from political
23
authority.
The thesis to which my skeletal historical account has been pointing is that the liberal-republican vision embodied in the Constitution
was fundamentally a response to the increasing inability to conceive
society as a tightly integrated, unified whole. As modernists, republicans embraced this fact and then sought to find other means to sustain
social and political order. Their solution, which we should understand
as a central strategy underlying the constitutional tradition, was to accept fragmentation of political authority and the plurality of values by
permitting numerous separate spheres to develop and by preserving
their separation. For republicanism, the central problem was organizing and legitimating authority; the central solution was differentiation
of authority into different and separate realms.
II.

The Constitutional Thesis: Structures, Not Rights

With this conception of republicanism in mind, we can begin to
develop an account of the place for "excluded reasons" in constitutional law. This account generates a different understanding of the
role that individual rights play as well. In many contexts, "rights" are
best understood as the way constitutional law marks the boundaries
between different spheres of political authority. That is, rather than
protecting individual autonomy, rights are often the tools constitutional law uses to maintain appropriate structural relationships of authority. The political philosopher Joseph Raz has made a similar
point: "At least some constitutional rights are primarily means of formal or informal institutional protection of collective goods. ' 24 Once
we recognize this, we can also see why many constitutional clashes
need not be resolved by judicial resort to balancing.
23. For analogous interpretations of the rise of liberalism in France, see HOLMES,
supranote 7, at 256 ("As an essential feature of the modem state, the person/office distinction is obviously closely linked to the public/private boundary."), and in England, see
HERZOG, supra note 7, at 169 ("Multiple roles, multiple institutions, perfectly distinct, and
infinitely different from each other: they add up not to chaos, but to order.").
24. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALrrY OF FREEDOM 258 (1986).
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There is, of course, no single role rights play in American constitutional law. Rights serve different purposes in different contexts.
Professor Fallon has incisively catalogued some of these different purposes.25 Thus, in some contexts, rights further the individual interest
in substantive well-being.2 6 In other contexts, rights preserve individual interests in autonomous choice. 27 In yet other contexts, rights protect the interests of individuals or groups in maintaining the social
basis for self-respect; here, rights protect "dignitary" interests. 28 In
these various contexts, a different account of the role of rights and the
relevance and techniques of balancing must be offered than the one I
develop here. My focus is on a different-but, I believe, pervasivecontext in which constitutional law invokes rights: where rights actuthe boundary lines between different spheres of
ally serve to mark out
29
political authority.
Differentiation involves a division of labor between the tasks of
political authority in different realms. 30 This sort of division serves
many purposes in modem societies. It can facilitate cooperative relations in one arena by confining potentially disabling conflicts to other
arenas. Keeping religion out of politics, for example, is only one of
many such "gag rules" 3 ' that respect the boundaries between separate
spheres of authority. The fragmentation of authority can, like other
divisions of labor, enable specialization of effort. Most interestingly,
respect for boundaries between political institutions or social roles can
enable the preservation of what might be called value pluralism.
Because this approach carves up social and political space into
distinct spheres, certain principles and values are appropriate in some
contexts, while others are appropriate elsewhere. Conflicts in value
can sometimes be best handled through institutional and social structures that avoid requiring one important value to trump another completely. When social understandings make certain values relevant in
particular contexts and other, potentially conflicting values relevant in
25. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., IndividualRights and the Powers of Government, 27
GA. L. REv. 343 (1993).
26. Id. at 353.
27. Id. at 354.
28. Id.
29. There is much common ground between my arguments here and those in Professor Fallon's lecture, for he also identifies a context in which rights serve to protect against
what he calls "systemic abuses." Id. at 355.
30. Thomas Nagel refers to "the moral division of labor" characteristic of modem,
liberal societies. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 53-62 (1991).
31. Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUtnONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagsted eds., 1988).
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other settings, all these values find some room for expression and can
thus be preserved. When values are diverse but important, the preservation of this tension between values-rather than the total triumph
of one set of values-fosters the richness of a complex society with
32
multiple aspirations.
"Rights" are often recognized in constitutional law as means of
marking separate spheres of authority in order to realize these kind of
values. When this is so, rights do not trump competing state interests. 33 Instead, rights are the means of defining the reasons for state
action that are appropriatein a particularsphere. Rights are therefore
not, in these contexts, recognitions of the essential elements of the
person in the way that contemporary liberalism conceives individual
dignity, autonomy, or freedom. Instead, they are the mechanism
through which the differentiation of political authority is maintained.
In other words, rights are the tools the American legal system has
created for judicially policing the reasons excluded from being legitimate justifications for state action in different spheres.
The difference between these alternative rights paradigms-one
individualistic, the other structural-has significant implications for
constitutional law, including the apparent problem of balancing.
Under the individualistic conception of rights, courts "balance" the
weight of individualized harms and the strength of legitimate state interests. Under the structural conception, courts evaluate the reasons
for state action in different spheres. The structural approach self-consciously recognizes that courts are not engaged in a seemingly quantitative exercise, but in the interpretive task of defining the principles of
state action that the Constitution permits in various spheres. The individualistic conception reasons "from the inside out"-from an assessment of the burdens on individuals to an examination of the strength
32.

See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 195 (1978) (ar-

guing that apparently inconsistent legislative policies may appropriately "reflect[ ] appreciation of the tragic choice," the equal importance of conflicting values); see also AMARTYA
SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 65-68 (1987) (arguing that economists should recognize
that values are irreducibly plural and choices that are formally "inconsistent" might nonetheless be desirable means of recognizing this pluralism); Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To Improve: UnderstandingAmerica's Welfare State, 101
YALE L.J. 685 (1991) (reviewing THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (1990)) (arguing that American social welfare policy is best understood in terms of multiple, competing aspirations).
In addition to the justifications offered in the text for strategies of differentiation,
other justifications might include avoidance of comprehensive and potentially oppressive
power, formation of common links between groups and individuals who would otherwise
have few, and delimitation of tasks for individuals whose calculative capacities are limited.
33. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1978).
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of the state's interests. The structural conception of rights focuses di-

rectly on a question external to the individuals involved-the legitimate scope of state authority. More than might be expected turns on
this difference.
A. An Example: The Establishment Clause

At this stage, a brief initial example might clarify the argument.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment precludes government from making any law "respecting the establishment of religion."'34 Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that Establishment
Clause questions involve claims of individual rights; thus, a sine qua
non for an Establishment Clause claim is a showing that government
has "coerced" individuals on matters of religious conviction. 35 Yet if a
showing of individualized "coercion" is indeed required, existing doctrine can be explained only through stretching the concept of "coercion" beyond its content in other legal areas. Indeed, to deal with
even core violations of the clause, the concept of "coercion" must be
interpreted so broadly that it is difficult to see what meaningful role
36
the concept would actually be playing.
Religious proselytizing by the government, for example, is presumably unconstitutional.3 7 Yet in order to deal with this seemingly
easy example, even advocates of the "coercion" test, such as Justice
Kennedy, must resort to concluding that governmental "speech may
coerce."138 That conclusion produces the right result if state proselytiz34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992); Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-62 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White.
36. In a critique of the "coercion" standard, one of its former proponents now acknowledges that "an emphasis on coercion could tend toward acquiescence in more subtle
forms of governmental power"; that for this reason "it is vital to understand the concept of
coercion broadly and realistically"; and that the Establishment Clause should ban sectarian
government proselytizing, but that such a doctrinal conclusion would bear "no logical connection to the coercion test." Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. CH. L. REv. 115, 159, 158, 162 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the constitution forbids government actions that "would
place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) ("The government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion."); see also McConnell, supra note 36, at 162
("Justice Kennedy is on solid ground in arguing that our government does not have free
rein to proselytize.").
38. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Speech may coerce in some circumstances .... ).
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ing is to remain unconstitutional, but the idea of coercive speech in a
non-captive audience setting is, at least, unfamiliar. In response to the
discomfort this elastic concept of coercion produces, some suggest distinguishing between state action that "annoys" individuals on religious
'39
grounds from that which exerts subtle "pressures and influences.
These refinements remain tied to a focus on harms measured individualistically. They substitute different gradations of psychological intrusiveness for coercion, but they require as a first step that courts
measure or assess the degree of burdens on individual rights.
This approach, characteristic of the individualistic conception of
rights, reasons outward from the relevant right. The structural perspective, on the other hand, focuses more directly on the boundary
line that the Establishment Clause creates between religious and political spheres. The relevant question is whether the reasons for the government action in question are consistent with this differentiation.
The exercise of state power itself is the object of judicial evaluation:
Are the reasons justifying this exercise permitted or excluded in light
of the best interpretive understanding of the separation of religious
and political spheres? Under this view, there is less judicial need to
"weigh" the extent of individualized harm than under doctrinal tests
that emphasize coercion, pressure, or influence. 40 No balancing of this
intrusion against state interests takes place. State religious advertisements are unconstitutional regardless of how one might characterize
or measure their burden on individuals. They are unconstitutional because the only justifications that can be offered for them involve principles or reasons that are constitutionally excluded as a basis for state
action.
In this context, rights do not serve (or, at least, do not serve exclusively) to protect individual aspects of conscience. Their principal
role is to provide a rhetoric for recognizing the relevant differentiation. It is an artifact of our standing rules and litigation system, perhaps, that has led to the framing of this problem in terms of individual
rights. For standing purposes, plaintiffs must establish individualized
harms; constitutional law therefore appears to be principally con39. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 36, at 159. This approach stems from McConnell's desire to distinguish "the actual effects of governmental power" from what he calls
"mere appearances." Id. at 158. The very point of the excluded reasons perspective, however, is that effects and appearances cannot be so sharply separated.
40. If this perspective seems to imply that Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982), is incorrectly
decided, because it suggests that mere "psychological consequence[s]" do not generate Establishment Clause standing, that implication would be correct.
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cerned with the protection of individualized rights.4 But in contexts
like these, courts are principally enforcing the structural relationship
between legitimate state authority in one sphere and in another.
B. Applying the Approach: General Considerations

More generally, a judicial focus on differentiation, excluded reasons, and the structural conception of rights leads to an emphasis on
two issues. First, the justifications behind governmental actions must
become paramount to judicial evaluation. This emphasis stands in
contrast to doctrines that resist purpose-based constitutional interpretations and focus on only the material or instrumental consequences
of state action. Second, the boundary lines (or "baselines" 42 ) that differentiation theory enforces should be understood to depend upon interpretations of the textual and historical understandings that give
substantive content to the different spheres.
(1) Justificationsv. Consequences

Boundaries between differentiated areas of state action are
drawn through political understandings that make only certain reasons appropriate grounds for action in a particular sphere. Thus, to
enforce commitments to differentiation, courts must focus on the reasons or justifications for public actions. The boundaries between distinct spheres are, themselves, simply matters of cultural
understandings. To enforce these boundaries is to enforce these understandings, which requires evaluation of the reasons behind the
state's action.
Reasons therefore matter-so much so that they should matter
even when the actions they motivate produce no discernible change in
material circumstances. This remains true despite the Court's occasional insistence that the Constitution reaches only state action that
has materially disadvantageous consequences for individuals. 43 For
41. These requirements are not followed consistently in all constitutional contexts.
For example, in last Term's decision in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the Court
permitted plaintiffs to raise equal protection challenges to race-conscious districting on the
basis of legal theories that do not require individualized harms. For a discussion of these
standing issues, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 Mici. L. REv. 483, 513-16 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. Rnv. 873, 875 (1987).
43. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1976) (describing Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), as a case in which the city's pool closing had extended
"identical treatment to both whites and Negroes").
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example, the Court sometimes concludes that if a plaintiff is no differently placed than she would have been had the government taken
some other, legitimately motivated action-or refrained from acting
at all-the government's action is neutral in effect. This is one way of
understanding the Court's conclusion in Palmer v. Thompson44 that
the Constitution was not violated when a city closed its segregated
swimming pools to avoid constitutionally mandated integration. In
the absence of an affirmative individual right to a city-provided swimming pool, a city can close a pool for good reasons, bad reasons, or no
reasons at all. On this view, reasons standing alone do not matteronly the material effects of actions are relevant.
The structural role of constitutional rights is inconsistent with this
view. Two state actions are not the same-ethically, expressively, and
sometimes legally-if they are taken for different reasons. How an
action comes about shapes what it means and therefore what it is.
These differences matter because actions that rest on different justifications express different values.
44. 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act
may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for
it."). Even since these decisions, the Court has steered an uneven course when considering
the relevance of purpose in different fields of constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) ("While the Court is normally deferential to a State's
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) ("For even though a
statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion [that
the statute have a secular purpose], the First Amendment requires that a statute must be
invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion."); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) ("Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law's
defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor.");
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (stating that the Court has a "reluctance to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the face of the statute"); Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) ("Illicit
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment."); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("Discriminatory purpose, however, implies
more than intent as volition or awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision
maker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."); City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975) ("Annexations animated by such a purpose
have no credentials whatsoever; for '[acts] generally lawful may become unlawful when
done to accomplish an unlawful end ....

' An annexation proved to be of this kind ...

is

forbidden ... whatever its actual effect may have been or may be.") (citation omitted). As
one commentator summarizes the case law, "[T]he Court's decisions do indicate a general
tendency, when all other things are equal, to grant greater deference to Congress and to
state legislatures so far as the inquiry into purpose is concerned." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

817 (2d ed. 1988).
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The differentiations that underlie the republican vision behind
the Constitution require that government respect the differences be-

tween the kind of reasons upon which it can act in one sphere versus
another. These differences are matters of collective understandings:

Maintaining these understandings is one of the tasks of constitutional
law. The individualistic conception of rights often obscures this fact.
But once the structural conception of rights is adopted, the focus is

not on the quantum of individualized harm involved, but rather on the
45
qualitative justifications for the state's exercise of authority.
(2) Baselinesfor Analysis

The second general question in applying the structural conception
of rights is determining how the boundaries between separate spheres
are to be judicially defined. In current constitutional vocabulary, this
is the "baseline" problem. Constitutional jurisprudence has defined
these baselines at various times by traditional common-law understandings of contract and property; or by efforts to determine the originally intended scope of various public-law commitments; or by
purportedly logical or conceptual analysis of certain legal formulas,
like "local" or "national" activity, "direct" or "indirect" economic ef45. This emphasis on the reasons or justifications for state action will, for some, raise
familiar concerns about judicial inquiry into legislative purposes. See, e.g., Palmer,403 U.S.
at 224 ("[I]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of
different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment."); Edwards,482 U.S. at 62637 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 703
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also supra note 44.
But judicial review of legislative justifications and motives might well be the task
judges are most well positioned to perform. As my colleague Don Regan has written, "If
we ask what subject matter judges as a class are most knowledgeable about (aside from
legal doctrine), it is surely politics. It is not physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, economics, social psychology," or other tools that might be necessary in evaluating the effects,
rather than the justifications, of public policies. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I)
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II)
ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MxcH. L. REv. 1865, 1872 (1987). Moreover, the purported difficulties with purpose analysis often rest on misconceptions about the task-for
example, the view that it requires courts to probe the subjective states of mind of public
actors. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 626-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Evaluating the justifications for public actions does not require divining the hidden, private motives behind
them. Indeed, at times, the justifications are explicitly articulated. When state action mandates public school prayer, there is no disagreement about the justifications the state offers
in defense. The constitutional question is whether these justifications are consistent with
the First Amendment. Even when no such explicit justification is available, the process is
one of constructing a narrative account that provides the most convincing explanation of
the reasons that an action has been taken-just as with any judicial act of purposive statutory interpretation.
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fects. 46 Since 1937, modern constitutional law has rejected these three
particular approaches as general means of fixing the boundary lines
between separate spheres of authority. The question of what to put in
their place has plagued constitutional thought ever since.
For public action, we can imagine four distinct approaches to this
task. The first is a narrowly confined positivism: The most recent decision of the appropriate public body, particularly a legislature, is, by
definition, the proper collective understanding of where these boundary lines should be fixed. On this view, the values of differentiation
can only be those reflected in the outcomes of day-to-day democratic
politics. A second approach is a Lochner-like conventionalism or
traditionalism: Existing patterns of differentiation are justified simply
by virtue of their long-standing existence. A third approach views
these past practices as having no legitimate normative claim on the
present. In the effort to develop independently justified principles of
differentiation, this kind of approach turns to what might loosely be
grouped as philosophical modes of justification: Differentiations are
to be justified, if at all, as deductions from more general first principles independently justified (human nature, justice, rationality, welfare maximization, or the like). Finally, the problem of baselines in
modern circumstances can be addressed through a method akin to
that of reflective equilibrium. Existing patterns of differentiation are
taken as starting points for reflective justification, but are not accepted uncritically. Appropriate boundary lines are justified if, after
considered judgment, they continue to serve important values. These
reflective convictions provide the starting points for further efforts to
develop general principles by which the values of differentiation can
be given content in new settings. This is the familiar legal method of
internal, critical interpretation and elaboration.
Without justifying doing so, this is the method I will use here.
The best way to describe this approach is by seeing it in practice. I
now turn, therefore, to concrete illustrations of the way reconceptualizing rights in structural terms-as markers for the different boundaries on political authority-avoids the "balancing" problem.

46. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988) (discussing the development of standing law through changing definitions of baselines).
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Specific Applications: The Structural Approach and the
Irrelevance of Balancing

The four examples that follow are drawn from disparate areas of
constitutional law: the First Amendment, the general area of unconstitutional conditions, voting rights, and equal protection. In each, I
argue that courts currently analyze conflicts under the individualistic
conception of rights, that this approach obscures the problem and
spawns conceptual confusion, and that the structural conception better illuminates the constitutional issues at stake. In the first three areas, the structural approach reaches the same outcome, but provides a
clearer and more convincing justification. In the last area, this approach provides a critical perspective on the Court's failure to appreciate the nature of the equal protection harm being asserted. In none
of these areas is judicial balancing, of the sort typically decried, necessary to resolve the problem.
A. The First Amendment: The Spheres of Public Education and
Democratic Politics

Within the public sphere, public education and democratic politics are differentiated arenas. As with most semi-autonomous spheres
of social and political interaction, the separation is not complete,
either in theory or practice. Nonetheless, the fact that these two
spheres should be partly differentiated from each other illustrates an
important regulative ideal for both policy and constitutional law.
In Boardof Education v. Pico,47 the plaintiffs challenged the decision of a local school board to remove nine books from the school's
public library. The Board initially characterized the books as "antiAmerican, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy" and concluded it had a "moral obligation[ ] to protect the children in our
schools from this moral danger as surely as from physical and medical
dangers. '48 The Board appointed a joint parent-teacher committee to
review the books, but rejected much of this committee's recommendation and ordered the books removed. In a divided decision, the
47. 457 U.S. 853 (1981). The academic commentary on the case includes James C.
O'Brien, The Promise of Pico: A New Definition of Orthodoxy, 97 YALE LJ.1805 (1988);
Mark G. Yudof, LibraryBook Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527 (1984); Walter A. Kamiat, Note, State Indoctrinationand the
Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibitionof School Library
Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1983).
48. Pico, 457 U.S. at 857. The books included Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five,
Richard Wright's Black Boy, the anonymously authored Go Ask Alice, and Best Short
Stories of Negro Writers, as compiled by Langston Hughes. Id.
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Supreme Court held that, under certain circumstances, a decision of
this sort would violate the First Amendment. The Court remanded
for fact finding to determine whether these circumstances were
49
present.
Three aspects of the Court's analysis are most significant. First,
the Court located the critical constitutional question in what it called
the motivation behind the Board's decision.50 This inquiry into the
justifications for the book removal depended on the specific type of
decision in question. The Court found two justifications permitting
school officials to remove books from school libraries consistent with
the First Amendment: if the books were not "educationally suitable,"
or if they were pervasively vulgar. 51 But by holding that school officials cannot exercise control over school libraries in a narrowly partisan or political manner, the Court indicated that the Board could not
constitutionally remove books for the purpose of expressing hostility
to the ideas they contained.5 2 Thus, the constitutionality of the decision depended upon the purposes for which it had been taken. Second, the Court held that in public schools, students had a right to
receive ideas. This First Amendment right was described as a necessary corollary to student rights of free speech and political participation.53 Third, in accord with modern styles of constitutional analysis,
the Court suggested the conflict implicated two competing interests
that had to be "balanced in some way": this student "right" to receive
information and the legitimate state interest in inculcating community
54
values through public education.
Framed in this way, the Court's analysis is vulnerable to several
telling criticisms, all raised in strong dissents. If students have an affirmative right to receive information, what difference should the reasons for the board's actions make? 55 Substantive rights guarantee
49. No single opinion commanded a majority of the Court. When referring to "the
Court," I will be focusing on the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens. Justice White wrote separately to concur in the judgment, id. at 883;
Justice Blackmun wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, id.
at 875.
50. Id. at 871.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 872.
53. Id. at 867.
54. Id. at 864.
55. Id. at 890-91, 897 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally Martin H. Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (arguing
that focus on reasons for government action undervalues harms to First Amendment from
the action's effects).
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certain states of affairs, not untainted decisional processes. In the
words of one dissenter, "Bad motives and good motives alike deny
access to the books removed. '56 The dissents went on to add that
students were not entitled in any event to the resulting state the
Court's decision suggested; even the Court acknowledged that the
board had substantial discretion in its initial book-purchasing decisions. Furthermore, had the board initially chosen not to purchase the
controversial books, students would have been in the same position as
they were following the removal decision. In constitutional terms, no
violation would have occurred had the Board not chosen to purchase
the books initially. Finally, once the Court endorsed the principle that
schools legitimately perform an "inculcative function," how could decisions over library content, made to carry out this function, violate
the First Amendment? The vaguely defined student "right to receive
information" directly contradicted this very function. Either that right
was unintelligible or the Court was not actually taking the schools'
57
inculcative role seriously.
Pico is vulnerable to these criticisms not because it is wrong, but
because the Court conceptualized the problem in conventional terms
that obscure the important issues. The plaintiffs' First Amendment
argument became a claim that "their" rights were being violated.
Once the Court framed the asserted rights in these individualistic
terms, it generated the subsequent problems, including the seeming
need for "balancing." The structural conception of rights, on the
other hand, can make sense of this kind of conflict. The case is not
about respecting the discrete interests of specific individuals, but
about upholding the differentiation between politics and education.
(1)

Structures v. Rights

The individualistic conception of rights in a context such as Pico
immediately runs into several problems. If rights protect the freedom
of individuals to make autonomous choices-thus allowing them to
preserve their dignity as independent moral agents-the application
of these principles to public school students is uncertain from the
start.
To begin with, the autonomy of minors, particularly students, is
substantially constrained in ways that would be impermissible for
adults-starting with the requirement of compulsory education itself.
56. Pico, 457 U.S. at 917 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 888-92 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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In addition, the concept of an affirmative right to receive information
is nebulous. Suppose, as the dissent argued, the students had ready
access to these books through avenues other than the school library.58

In what way, if any, would their information-receiving rights be injured by the book-removal decision? In more traditional contexts,
government cannot regulate the content of speech on the theory that
the speaker could say the same things elsewhere. But that principle is
easy to apply with rights of self-expression; it becomes more difficult

for an asserted right to receive information. The scope of any such
right must inevitably be more indefinite than more familiar First
Amendment rights.
And what of the dissent's argument that, if rights are involved,

judicial concern should be with the effects, rather than the motives, of
a school board's decision? An answer to this argument must begin
with the recognition that context matters. A student's "right to receive information" cannot mean all information disseminated in any
way. Such a right must be refined more precisely. At most, it would
have to be limited in ways consistent with the legitimate educational
purposes of public schools. That brings the issue of structural relationships to the surface: If any "right" is involved, it is to a specific
sort of educational environment. "Rights" here are surrogates for de-

fining an institutional space with a particular character. But since
these structural relationships are central, analysis would be improved
by focusing on them directly.5 9
Pico must rest on a constitutional distinction between public education designed to develop critical, rational, and democratic capaci-

ties, and education designed to ensure that students conform to
60
currently prevailing community perceptions of "correct" ideas.

58. "[Tlhe most obvious reason that petitioners' removal of the books did not violate
respondents' right to receive information is the ready availability of the books elsewhere.
Students are not denied books by their removal from a school library." Id. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. This is the approach the Court took in another school speech case, Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In prohibiting a school from
blocking students from engaging in silent political protest in the schools by wearing arm
bands, the Court did not seek to "balance" student rights against the school's interest in
inculcating dominant community values. Instead, the Court recognized the basic principle
that a state may not "so conduct its schools as to 'foster a homogeneous people."' Id. at
511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1926)). Thus, the immunity of students
engaging in nondisruptive political protest was protected on the instrumental ground that
such speech contributed to the proper educational role of the schools: exposing students to
differing perspectives on controversial issues.
60. For a fuller elaboration of this democratic theory of education, see Kamiat, supra
note 47; AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987). Gutman argues that the theory
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These principles exist in tension, of course, and the line between them
is hardly sharp. But only interpretation and resolution of this tension
can begin to make sense of this kind of conflict.
(2) Purposes v. Consequences

From this structural perspective, the relevance of the purposes
behind book removal becomes more apparent. Preserving constitutionally mandated boundaries of political authority requires enforcing
understandings about the proper bases for state action.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun espoused a structural
approach-focused on the justifications for the book removal-rather
than the rights approach the Court's plurality embraced. As he put it,
the decision could be understood in terms of a "general principle"
whose enforcement necessarily turned on inquiry into the purposes
behind public action: "[T]he State may not suppress exposure to
ideas-for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure to ideas-absent
sufficiently compelling reasons."'61
This approach focuses, in a perhaps disarmingly simple way, on
the principles behind the exercise of governmental authority. With
the proliferation of line drawing, balancing, multi-factor tests, and
similar modem techniques, the Constitution has taken on a "formulaic" cast. 62 This modem effort to provide more analytical structure to doctrine has made it more difficult to focus on basic principles
concerning the structural relationship between different spheres of
authority.
The structural alternative, with its emphasis on excluded reasons,
hearkens back to the constitutional method of the late nineteenth century. By focusing on general principles of structural relation, this apof democracy itself should be understood to require that authority over education be
shared among parents, citizens, and professional educators, none of whom should be understood to have a monopoly on this authority. GurTmAN, supra, at 42. Moreover, this
authority is always to be constrained by two substantive principles: "nonrepression" and
"nondiscrimination." The former prohibits educational policy from suppressing "rational
deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and the good society"; the latter
requires that "all educable children be educated." Id. at 44-45. Together, these constraints
seek to assure that the inculcative functions of education remain consistent with democracy
itself. As she puts it, "[A]dults must therefore be prevented from using their present deliberative freedom to undermine the future deliberative freedom of children," id. at 45, and
"[Citizens and public officials can[not] use democratic processes to destroy democracy,"
id. at 14.
61. Pico, 457 U.S. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONsTTUTIONAL CuLTuREs: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEoUENCES OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 121-22 (1989) (criticizing modem doctrine's tendency to
lead to a "formulaic constitution").

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

that
proach recaptures a simplicity and clarity of decision making
63
values.
public
of
understanding
and
articulation
furthers the

Once conflicts like that in Pico are cast in terms of the proper
structural relationships between distant institutions, certain confusions

that stem from rights-oriented perspectives vanish. Questions of
whether "rights" have been violated or "pressured" 64 become less critical. Actions affecting public schools-whether taken by school administrators, legislators, or local parents' organizations-ought not be
taken for reasons inconsistent with the principles that define the
proper role of public schools. Similarly, questions of whether students

are legally or even psychologically coerced by these actions can be
seen as sometimes misdirected. The proper focal point is the action
itself and whether the values expressed through it are consistent with a
proper conception of the distinct role of schools.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions: The Paradox of Defining Public
Programs
A common paradox arises in many claims that the government
has conditioned grant of a public benefit on an unconstitutional condition. The problem is how to determine whether the government is
creating a new program rather than attaching new conditions to an old
program. New programs typically pass constitutional muster, while
new conditions on old ones may raise serious constitutional issues, the
63. In response to concerns regarding purpose-oriented constitutional doctrines, it is
worth noting in this context that, as the structural approach emphasizes, the conflict in Pico
is precisely over social understandings. The actors involved already understand the conflict
in these terms. Their aim is not simply to bring about a certain end result-it is to do so on
the basis of particular purposes widely understood as the basis for their action. Changing
social understandings is central to their goal. In Pico itself and similar cases, book removal
is often done with great fanfare and much publicity, and occasionally with book burning.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Pico that "[d]efendants conducted themselves . . . in a manner calculated to create a public uproar .... They insured that the
impression would be created that freedom of expression in the District would be determined in some substantial measure by the majority's will." Pico v. Board of Educ., 638
F.2d 404, 416 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kamiat, supra note 47, at 534 n.126 (discussing the
contexts of similar cases). A central point of these struggles is the establishment of control
over how the boundary between schools and the community is understood. The contest is
not over the particular books at issue, but over what purposes and principles local communities can invoke in regulating public schools. It is a contest for control over the meaning
of institutions. Judicial emphasis on the school board's justifications for acting, then, directly engages the conflict in the terms in which it is already understood. And once certain
purposes are established to be impermissible, pursuing the same ends more covertly would
in many contexts be self-defeating.
64. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1500-03 (1989).
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resolution of which turns on how the government benefit is characterized. The paradox seems semantic, yet many unconstitutional conditions cases turn on it. Moreover, individual rights approaches cannot
resolve the problem.
A recent case illustrates the difficulties. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University v. Sullivan65 involved a proposal
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a public agency under
the Department of Health and Human Services, to award two $1.5
million contracts for a five-year research project on artificial hearts.
These contracts contained a confidentiality clause, which required researchers to notify government contract officers at least forty-five
days in advance whenever the researchers intended to publish preliminary findings. The government (through the contracting officer) could
then decide to block publication if it would involve "unvalidated findings [that] could create erroneous conclusions which might threaten
public health or safety if acted upon. '66 The district court invalidated
this provision on First Amendment grounds. But its method of analysis reveals the difficulties with individualistic, as opposed to structural,
conceptions of rights.
In the court's view, extraction of this confidentiality pledge constituted an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds.
To reach this conclusion, the district court had to distinguish Rust v.
Sullivan,67 which it did by following the Supreme Court's lead in char-

acterizing the regulations in Rust as program-defining ones. In contrast, the district court described the confidentiality clause in Stanford
University as not defining the heart research program funded by the
government. Instead, the district court focused on the fact that the
clause applied "directly" to potential speakers. In the court's view,
this fact meant that the clause did more than merely define the scope
of the funded program. As the court put it, the ban "could not validly
be defended on the basis that it is tied to the heart research program
rather than the researchers, for the latter, as noted, would be precluded from speaking or publishing about artificial heart research
65. 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991).
66. Id. at 474 n.5 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 352.224-70(b) (1984)). Another regulation defined the criteria in terms of "findings ...which have the possibility of adverse effects on
the public or the Federal agency." Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 352.224-70(f) (1984)). A second
provision, which Stanford did not challenge, prohibited disclosure of personal information
about individuals in the research study and of proprietary information concerning institutions. Id. at 474 n.6 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 352.224-70(a) (1984)).
67. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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even on their own time."'68 Thus, the court found that the free speech
rights of researchers were violated because the pre-publication review
reached not just within the program, but beyond it.
This method of analysis reads like semantic formalism in the absence of substantive principles that define the constitutionally required structural relationship between science and government. How
is the crucial distinction between legitimate "program-defining" conditions and unconstitutional constraints "directly" on individual rights
to be determined? Indeed, the district court made its conclusion easier by reading the pre-publication clearance requirement more
broadly than it might have been designed to apply. Suppose the court
had considered a more plausible reading (or a redrafted requirement)-one in which the pre-publication review process applied only
to information a researcher gained as a result of work on a government project. 69 Would that more narrowly targeted requirement
make the conditional funding constitutional, on the ground that the
government had now legitimately defined the program rather than impermissibly conditioned participation in it? Or suppose that the grant
defined the government as copyright holder of all reports generated
from funded research and specified that the government would waive
this copyright after it decided general publication would further the
public welfare. Could the government argue that the "program" it
would be funding would not involve scientific research in general, but
research that is careful, not published until well validated, and consistent with the public welfare? How does this differ from the argument
the Supreme Court accepted in Rust-that the "program" funded by
the government was a "family planning" one, rather than a comprehensive "prenatal care" one?
The problem raised by this case can be abstracted and generalized. Any restriction on government funded program X can always
68. Stanford University, 773 F. Supp. at 476 n.13. The court appeared to read the preclearance requirements as extending even to information related to artificial heart research
obtained outside of the federally funded research projects.
69. If this seems administratively difficult, note that the government at times has asserted ownership of any patentable discoveries that emerge from funded research, which
necessitates just this kind of segregation. For example, before 1963,
every inventor was required to report nuclear-related inventions to the AEC
[Atomic Energy Commission] or to file a patent application.... Unless the applicant could prove to the satisfaction of the commission that his invention was not a
product of government sponsorship, he lost all rights to it and to the patent issuing thereon.
James E. Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Development Contracts, 53
VA. L. REv. 564, 572 (1967) (emphasis added).
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be said, at least logically, to instead define a distinct program Z (which
we might conceptualize as X - Y, where Y represents whatever options
the funding condition forecloses). This is a problem of considerable
practical importance when addressing funding conditions. In a system
conceptually dominated by private ordering, government participation
almost by definition changes the status quo. If the initial baseline X is
defined through private action, it always becomes possible to argue
that the entry of government, via its funding powers, is not a modification to X, but an entirely new program-precisely because it now involves the government. There is nothing inherent in the concept of
either a "program" or a "condition" that marks distinctions between
conditioned programs and newly redefined programs. To break this
circle, there must be some limitation on government's power to characterize its funding offers as "new" programs. In other words, just as
nothing inherently distinguishes "programs" from "conditions," there
is no inherent content to the concepts "new" or "old" in this context.
A normative conception of what gives programs their integrity is
required.
This is a structural question, the answer to which a historical appreciation of the role of differentiation in the constitutional scheme
helps illuminate. If the NIH confidentiality clause is an unconstitutional condition, it must be so because of a prior conclusion that government must respect the internal norms of science concerning the
validation and publication of research findings. (If the grants had
specified that publication could occur only after a scientific peer review process had been completed, the case might look different.)
Structural First Amendment values reflect a commitment to preserving the practices and understandings that create a distinct sphere of
scientific inquiry that is relatively autonomous from certain other influences, such as those of the state or organized religion.70 This autonomy is only relative, and the government surely can regulate on the
basis of certain justifications. 71 But in Stanford University, the government's justification for requiring preclearance of scientific publications was to insure that premature disclosure of information did not
"threaten public health or safety." Such paternalistic justifications for
state intervention are inconsistent with respect for the internal norms
70. See generally Steven Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of American Science,
1979 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1 (1979) (arguing that the Constitution should be understood to
insulate scientific inquiry from religiously motivated government restrictions).
71. Upon sufficient showings of necessity, the government might regulate funded research on national security grounds, or scientific research in general on grounds of protecting humans who are used as subjects in scientific investigation.
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of scientific research and dissemination of ideas-norms grounded in
established First Amendment understandings.
Although the district court addressed this conflict through the
language of individual rights, problems similar to those in Pico arise
here. In the context of government-funded research, making sense of
any individual right of "scientific free expression" is, at the least, often
puzzling. Such rights are necessarily qualified by the legitimate interests the government has in its own programs. Government contracts,
for example, might bar researchers from exploiting for personal financial gain any commercial applications of their government-funded scientific research. At times, the government has asserted the right to
72
reap the commercial benefits from its own investments in research.
If researchers have an individual right to publish without government
interference, contractual restraints of these sorts might seem just as
objectionable as those invalidated in Stanford University. Measured in
terms of the degree of intrusion on the interests of individual scientists, such restraints seem just as burdensome. The extent of state intrusion on individual speech is the same, but the justification is
different. Yet would the commercial-application bar have to rest on
"compelling" governmental interests that no less restrictive alternative could protect? If ordinary First Amendment understandings are
to be applied to government-funded research scientists, as Stanford
University can be read to suggest, prior-restraint doctrines might then
apply. If that is inappropriate, it must be because commercial restrictions within particular programs (namely government-funded ones)
are not the same as prior restraints in other contexts. Conceiving the
"rights" claimed in individualistic terms eclipses these differences.
Structural conceptions of rights must take precedence to resolve
the dilemma. Judgments about the permissible scope of the governmental program, not individual liberty, must be central. The issue is
the appropriate structural relationship between science and government. This structural perspective breaks the conceptual logjam between "programs" and "conditions." Only after substantive baselines
that give content to the boundaries between separate spheres are defined can legitimate new "programs" be properly separated from
"conditions" on existing programs. Rights are not recognized here for
intrinsic reasons, but as techniques for defining these structural rela72. See generally Dobkin, supra note 69. Since 1980, these issues have been controlled by the University and Small Business Patent Procedure Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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tionships. 73 Rights are surrogates for defining the excluded reasons
for which government cannot act in this sphere.
The central role of excluded reasons and structural conceptions

of fights also explains why "germaneness" requirements are more relevant in unconstitutional conditions cases than some academic commentary suggests. 74 When conditions fit the purposes for which
government is spending money, government is less likely to be intrud-

ing into some distinct, semi-autonomous realm that the Constitution
requires be governed by distinct norms. 75 Stricter scrutiny is therefore
appropriate when conditions on government benefits do not exhibit
this fit. In the unconstitutional conditions cases, "gernaneness" re-

quirements are not merely or even primarily a means of policing interest-group politics. 76 Instead, they serve (or can serve, when used

appropriately) to enforce the values of differentiation. Germaneness
requirements can facilitate enforcement of the boundaries between

different spheres of political authority.
C. Voting Rights

Thus far, I have argued that the Constitution should be understood, in part, as organized around the principle of differentiation:
The Constitution creates multiple spheres of political authority, ones
governed by distinct principles concerning the reasons that are appropriate bases for government action in different areas. From this per73. A somewhat similar point is reflected in Seth Kreimer's sketch of how unconstitutional conditions cases ought to be conceived, see Seth F. Kreimer, Government "Largesse"
and ConstitutionalRights: Some Paths Through and Around the Swamp, 26 SAN DIGO L.
REv.229 (1989), and in Jed Rubenfeld's argument that "[t]he right to privacy is a political
doctrine," see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. Rlv. 737, 804 (1989). In
apparent contrast to Rubenfeld, however, I put more emphasis on the expressive content
of government action than the material consequences Rubenfeld seems to emphasize.
74. See Sullivan, supra note 64, at 1456-76.
75. Some conditions on federal funds might not be germane, but might also not involve boundary violations of the sort I am arguing ought to be of principal concern.
Hence, while germane conditions might always be consistent with respect for differentiation, nongermane ones are not necessarily at odds with this respect. Because the crucial
concern is not germaneness per se, but instead what germaneness signals about maintenance of justified boundary lines, nongermane conditions that do not violate these kinds of
boundaries do not seem troubling. We might then say that nongermaneness is overinclusive with respect to the concerns expressed here. Nonetheless, it plays a larger role in a
normative analysis of these conflicts than is sometimes acknowledged in contemporary
commentary.
76. As interpreted in Sullivan, supra note 64, at 1458 (analyzing the "germaneness"
test as way of ferreting out "legislative corruption"), and 1476 ("Germaneness has more to
do with disciplining governmental activity according to some independent norm of appropriate legislative process than it does with protecting constitutional rights.").
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spective derives the more specific conception of constitutional rights I
have asserted. Rights are often best understood in structural terms, as
means by which courts police the boundaries between these distinct
spheres of public authority. On this view, constitutional adjudication
becomes less a matter of "balancing" individual rights against state
interests and more a matter of defining appropriate and excluded reasons for state action in different arenas. Courts evaluate reasons qualitatively, for their appropriateness, rather than weighing them
quantitatively.
Voting rights jurisprudence offers another example of this process
at work and also reveals how modem judicial rhetoric obscures that
process. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections7 7 and
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,78 two of the central cases
in this area, have long seemed inconsistent in method and substance
to commentators. In Lassiter,the Court upheld North Carolina's con79
ditioning of the franchise on satisfactory passage of a literacy test.
But seven years later in Harper, the Court, dramatically reversing
precedents of only fifteen years earlier, held that the Constitution prohibits states from conditioning voting in state elections on payment of
state poll taxes.
Lassiter uses neither the language of "fundamental rights" nor
"strict scrutiny" to analyze franchise restrictions. Instead, it highlights
the "wide scope" and "broad powers" states possess to "determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised." 80 In
contrast, Harperends with ringing oratory on voting as a fundamental
liberty, restrictions of which must be "closely scrutinized and carefully
confined. 8 1 From these differences in rhetoric and outcomes, many
have concluded that the cases simply reflect two different eras in fundamental rights analysis and stand in basic contradiction. On this
view, literacy tests cannot "survive the properly herculean demands of
strict equal protection review," and hence Lassiter is best understood
as having "antedated the era of exacting scrutiny of restrictions on the
77. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
78. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
79. The Court acknowledged that literacy tests might be unconstitutional in two circumstances. First, such a test would be unconstitutional on its face when it gives state
officials insufficiently constrained discretion to determine what constitutes satisfactory passage. Second, even a test fair on its face would be unconstitutional when applied in a
discriminatory manner. Lassiter,360 U.S. at 53.
80. Id. at 50-51.
81. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
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franchise." 2 In other words, both cases involve weighing rights
against state interests; the only difference is that voting was not yet
recognized as a weighty enough right when the Court upheld literacy
tests.
From the outset, though, this view should seem suspect. To begin
with, Justice Douglas wrote both decisions and he, along with the
three other Justices who joined both opinions, presumably found the
two decisions consistent. Moreover, Justice Douglas had taken the
view that poll taxes were unconstitutional as early as 1951;83 even at
the time Lassiterwas decided, then, he viewed poll taxes and literacy
tests differently. His Harper opinion refers approvingly to Lassiter,
without any suggestion of a new direction being taken in voting-rights
jurisprudence. And in the years since Harper,the Court has continued to rely on Lassiter. In short, the Court itself has never seen the
contradiction or tension between these pivotal voting-rights cases that
many commentators see.
Once constitutional analysis moves away from balancing metaphors and focuses on excluded reasons, a better framework for understanding and reconciling these cases becomes available. Both cases
reflect the view that voting is a distinct sphere of public action, structured by a distinct set of constitutional norms. These norms govern
the kinds of justifications that will be treated as proper or excluded
bases for state action in this sphere. Literacy tests and poll taxes differ, in the Court's view, precisely because they rest on different justifications and reflect different theories about the nature of voting. The
cases are both fundamentally concerned with the same issue: the
kinds of reasons that are permitted and excluded as a basis for state
regulation of the franchise. Poll taxes rest on constitutionally impermissible reasons, while literacy tests do not. This follows not from
how weighty or fundamental voting is, but from the Court's view of
the constitutional nature of voting itself.
Once we get past the more formulaic recitations of rights and
strict scrutiny, the language of the decisions clearly signals that the
actual focus is on excluded reasons. The justification for literacy tests
is that they help define a political community with the relevant competence for political participation; Lassiter views defining the community in these terms to be constitutionally permissible. In the Court's
language, the "ability to read and write likewise has some relation to
82. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 44, at 1093.
83. Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." 84 "Some
relation" is sufficient because the state is permitted to construct the
political community on the basis of this principle. But in Harper,the
very justification for poll taxes is itself the obstacle to their constitutionality. As the Court puts it, to "introduce wealth or payment of a
fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious
or irrelevant factor."8 5- There is no balancing here, no weighing of
rights, burdens, and governmental interests against each other. Making eligibility to vote dependent upon ability to pay a fee, however
nominal that fee, simply reflects a conception of the political community that the Constitution does not permit.
This is the "excluded reasons" approach to constitutional adjudication. The relevant question is the nature of the justifications for various state regulations of the franchise. Literacy tests differ from poll
taxes, in the Court's view, because the former have "some relation" to
a constitutionally acceptable definition of the political community,
while wealth and payment of taxes "have no relation" 86 to that conception. The crucial question is one of relevance, not weight, which is
why the Court (as in the unconstitutional conditions cases) focuses on
whether a particular franchise condition is "germane" to the legitimate constitution of the political community.8 This germaneness
concern explains why, despite Harper'sobscuring language of fundamental rights and strict scrutiny, the Court has always treated the two
decisions as wholly consistent.
Again, then, constitutional rights primarily serve here to mark the
structural boundaries between differentiated spheres of public authority. The issue is not the quantum of intrusion on individual freedoms,
but the nature of the reasons purportedly justifying particular collective intrusions. The relevant structural boundaries are defined by the
different sorts of principles on which the government can act in different arenas; certain reasons are excluded in some spheres but not
others. For purposes of political participation, the Constitution permits the state to divide citizens along lines of threshold political competence, but not financial status. That conclusion is one of principle,
one whose application does not require judicial balancing.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51.
Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 668.
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D. Equal Protection
The power of structural differentiation and excluded reasons as
an alternative to judicial balancing comes in part from its ability to
explain and justify large bodies of seemingly disparate constitutional
doctrine. Thus far, I have argued that this alternative helps clarify
aspects of current First Amendment doctrine, unconstitutional conditions problems, and voting rights. But part of the power of this alternative also lies in its critical capacity. As a final example, I therefore
turn to a quintessential equal protection conflict, one in which the
Court can be criticized for failing to adhere to the kind of structural
approach reflected in Lassiter and Harper.
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,8 8 the Court in a five to
four decision rejected the equal-protection claim of an indigent school
child seeking exemption from substantial user fees ($97/year) for public school bus service to rural schools in sparsely populated North Dakota. 89 Prevailing equal protection analysis requires that conflicts like
these be disaggregated into the familiar constituent components of
"suspect classes" and "fundamental rights." Not surprisingly, the
Court reaffirmed that differential wealth effects do not, in general,
trigger heightened scrutiny,90 and that education is not a fundamental
right.91 Once the conflict is organized in these terms, the only question left is whether a rational basis-that is, any affirmative state interest-can be said to underlie the policy. The Court found such a
basis in the state's admittedly tautological interest in limiting public
bus service to those who could afford it. The state could conclude
rationally that its efforts to encourage local school districts to provide
bus service would be undermined if they had to subsidize indigent
users.

92

Central to this perspective is the Court's increasingly common focus on only the material consequences of policies. In the search for a
baseline that would anchor its analysis, the Court compared poor stu88. 487 U.S. 461 (1987).
89. More precisely, the State of North Dakota had delegated to certain school districts the power to charge user fees for public transportation to school. These fees could
not exceed the estimated cost to the school district of providing the service.
90. Id. at 458.
91. Id. at 458, 465. While denying that education is a fundamental right for purposes
of the equal protection clause, the Court has suggested that there might be such a right to
minimum access to education. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25
n.60 (1973). The Kadrmas Court held that the statute did not violate any more minimal
entitlement of this sort. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458.
92. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462.
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dents before and after the state's action. In the Court's view, poor

students were no worse off after the buses had started to run than
before: "The Constitution does not require that such service be pro-

vided at all, and it is difficult to imagine why choosing to offer the
service should entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for free. '93
Once the alleged harm is framed in terms of individualized material
effects, this conclusion follows.
For those who find this conclusion troubling, familiar bodies of
scholarship and doctrine provide little assistance. First, it is difficult to
frame the issue as a violation of minimal substantive entitlements to
meaningful education; 94 if the focus is on individual rights of access,

the Court's response seems direct. If any such right would not be violated had there been no public school bus at all, how could it be vio-

lated when buses are provided and user fees charged? Furthermore,
under this view, if the fee did not effectively deny access to school, but
simply made the path more difficult, the entitlement claim would be
weakened further. 95 Yet even on these facts, the policies still seem
troubling.

Second, the Court distinguished the small body of equal protection precedents that invalidate de facto wealth distinctions in access to
certain public goods, such as appeals in criminal cases. 96 The Court
found it crucial that in those situations, the state held a practical or

legal monopoly on the good at issue. 97

93. Id.
94. Despite denying the general status of education as a fundamental right under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court has suggested that access to a minimally adequate education might be such a right. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25 n.60. For an argument
that education should be understood as a fundamental right for equal protection purposes,
see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
95. Indeed, the Court's decision relied on the finding that the plaintiff had been able
to find alternative means to school. The Court thus interpreted the complaint as challenging "greater obstacle[s]" to school attendance, rather than effective denials of access.
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458.
96. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955). For other cases invalidating filing
fees and similar fees as applied to indigents, see Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (costs
of blood tests in paternity suit); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (bond for twice the
amount of rent at issue in a landlord-tenant dispute); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (court fees and costs for service of process for dissolution action); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for application for writ of habeas corpus).
97. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 460-61. For debate over whether state monopolization of
the relevant good adequately explains or justifies the distinctions the Court has drawn,
compare Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights-PartI, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1178-80 (finding the monopolization
rationale "unpersuasive"), with Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
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Third, the recently burgeoning literature on unconstitutional conditions offers no insight into this kind of problem. After all, the state
did not require children to pledge not to criticize the school if they
attended-it only required that they pay for a service they wanted to
receive.

98

Finally, one might ask, as did some dissenting Justices, whether
this policy impermissibly "discriminates" against the poor.99 But there
are difficulties with characterizing user fees as a form of discrimination. Concepts of discrimination have distinct, if contested, legal significance. It is unclear how persuasive they can be made in contexts
such as this, which involve de facto wealth barriers to constitutionally
gratuitous goods.
A structural understanding of the "rights" asserted in Kadrmas
better captures what is actually at stake. From the perspective of differentiation, the issue is whether government action is consistent with
its obligations to respect the principles that give separate spheres their
relative autonomy. Here, the question is what distinct kind of social
good public education should be understood to be. The answer does
not depend upon the lexical ordering of education in some hierarchy
of fundamental rights; nor does it depend on whether the state is a
monopoly supplier of this good. Rather, the answer stems from the
constitutionally most appropriate conception of public education.
Public education must be distributed in accord with principles
that respect this conception. These principles make certain distributional criteria irrelevant in this sphere. Seen in this way, the claim in
Kadrmas is precisely the same claim in the educational sphere that the
Court in Harper °° accepted in the sphere of political participation.
That claim is that, within the public school, access and participation
ought not turn on students' political views, social status, wealth, or
certain other factors. All students ought to be treated as equal members of the educational community in the sense that certain potential
grounds of distinction are deemed irrelevant. In the educational
sphere, these principles are not controversial when it comes to distinctions based on ability to pay; indeed, the Court has noted that imposAmendment, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 981, 1007-08 (1979) (arguing that monopolization condition
is necessary to keep doctrine within appropriate bounds).
98. There is no suggestion that indigents would not be able to attend school at allonly that doing so would be more burdensome-and no suggestion that the state wouldor could-enforce mandatory school attendance laws on indigents who had no means of
transporting themselves to school.
99. See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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ing tuition fees for entrance to the public schools, with no waiver for
indigent students, would present a "more compelling" case for judicial
relief.10 1 The question in Kadrmas, then, was whether public school
transportation should be understood as an aspect of public education
itself and hence governed by the same principles.
Segregating the poor at the school bus doors does not have the
same extreme exclusionary consequences, in material terms, as segregating them at the school house doors. As the Court found, user fees
might create greater obstacles to access, but do not necessarily effectively deny it altogether. But educational policies do not just have
material effects. They also help construct the collective understandings that give education its particular meaning. They help constitute
the reasons that are appropriate and those that are excluded when the
state acts in the educational sphere. In this light, the effects of policies
like those at issue in Kadrmas must be gauged in terms other than
quanta of individual harms. We should ask how these policies shape
the collective understandings that ought to characterize public education. When it comes to the judicial role, we can ask whether courts
should not take these understandings-the reasons permitted and excluded for state action-as a central constitutional concern. Indeed, if
judicial effectiveness is measured in terms of material changes in existing practices, it is not clear how well courts fare. 10 2 Perhaps courts
are best situated instead to express the normative principles-the permitted and excluded reasons-that guide public action in different
spheres.
In Kadrmas, access fees for public schools challenged the traditional principles that define the distribution of public education. The
state wanted to provide a user-fee-funded service, rather than one
subsidized through general tax revenues, for fiscal reasons. 0 3 But the
101. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25 n.60; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking
down a statute that withheld state funds for the education of, and authorized denial of
enrollment to, children of illegal aliens).
102. For an extreme statement of this position, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (suggesting limits
in certain circumstances to judicial effectiveness understood in material terms). For criticisms that Rosenberg's book fails to support its extreme claims of judicial ineffectiveness,
see Neil Devins, JudicialMatters, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (1992) (reviewing ROSENBERG,
supra); David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v.
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151 (1994); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation
and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763 (1993) (reviewing ROSENBERG, supra).
103. Conceivably, the state made this choice for the very purpose of hindering access
for lower-class students. But the Supreme Court's decision contains no evidence that suggests such a covert purpose; none is necessary to find the fee troubling on the grounds
developed in the text.
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"rational basis" test-in the sense of any affirmative state interest supporting the policy-is poorly suited to evaluate the plaintiffs' claims.
Nor does intensifying the level of scrutiny-demanding that the state
interest be "important" or "compelling"-adequately play this role.
From the perspective of differentiation, the issue is not the weight of
the state's interest, but the nature of that interest. What is important
is whether the state's justifications are consistent with the constitutional principles that define public education.
This approach bypasses debates about whether education is or is
not a "fundamental" right. Instead, the question is what kind of social
good education should be constitutionally understood to be-what
kind of distinct social understandings concerning education characterize the way it is organized and distributed. 10 4 Even when the state
distributes a good it need not provide at all, constitutional principles
can be undermined when the distributional logic involved erodes the
autonomy and authority of what should be distinct spheres. Collective
understandings, legal and nonlegal, give content to these separations.
Individualistic, materially focused conceptions of rights miss the importance of enforcing these understandings. Nor is balancing required
to enforce them, for balancing is itself a product of organizing these
conflicts as ones of rights versus state interests. Instead, the judicial
role often involves defining the distinct nature of different social
goods. That role does not require case-by-case judicial balancing.
Conclusion
We sometimes make the theory of constitutional adjudication
more complex than it need be. In many contexts, the problems of
"balancing" arise from a misconception of the role that rights actually
play. Partly as a product of legal conventions like standing doctrines,
we think of "rights" as protections against highly specific individualized harms-affronts to individual entitlements to liberty, dignity, or
autonomy. Once this individualistic conception is embraced, constitutional conflicts become organized around the dynamics of individual
rights versus state interests. The rhetoric of balancing, as well as the
apparent problems that balancing entails, then comes to dominate
constitutional discourse.
104. The question of what role judges should play as second-order enforcers of differentiation, as opposed to relying solely on the internalization of these norms by first-order
enforcers, is assumed (but not argued) in this example.
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But constitutional rights often play another role. They are linguistic tools for defining the boundaries between separate spheres of
political authority. In this role, rights are the legal technique for protecting various structural differentiations. Rights serve this function
by signalling different "excluded reasons" that cannot be the justification for government action in different spheres. The "right" to vote
means that government may not make financial means a basis for defining political competence; the "right" to free speech means that government may not attempt to politically indoctrinate public-school
students; the "right" to freedom of religious conscience means that
government may not act for the purpose of endorsing religion or religious sects.
The "excluded reasons" approach to constitutional law entails a
distinct method of judicial decision making. When courts apply this
approach, explicitly or, more commonly, implicitly, they do not balance individual rights against state interests. Judicial rhetoric aside,
the process is not the purportedly quantitative one of assigning
weights to these incommensurable entities. Defining excluded reasons is instead a qualitative task, one that requires courts to evaluate
the justifications for public action against the principles that give different spheres their unique normative structure. This approach may
be less complex than the seemingly more sophisticated and rigorous
ones of balancing, multi-factor formulas, and other purportedly analytical techniques. But it has the countervailing virtue of coming
much closer, in my experience, to describing the way judges actually
decide cases. In defining excluded reasons, courts make judgments
concerning the reasons for state actions and assess those reasons
10 5
against constitutional principle.
The vision of rights as markers for the structural boundaries between different spheres of political authority is closely linked to the
original constitutional vision. I have argued that the distinctly modem
feature of American republicanism was its acceptance of the view that
stability could best be achieved by embracing fragmented political authority and pluralistic systems of value. Differentiating distinct arenas
105. For other articles that appear to reflect a similar view, see David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992); Robert C. Post, The ConstitutionalConcept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987); Louis
Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary
Maintenance Theory of ConstitutionalLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987).
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of legitimate authority, constituted by diverse values, was the strategic
means by which this view was institutionalized. At one time, in the
late nineteenth century, courts did self-consciously understand their
role to be defining the boundaries between distinct spheres of authority. With the general discrediting of the Lochner era and the rise of
Legal Realism, however, this view has faded. Yet without endorsing
the substance of that era's constitutionalism, its general judicial
method is worth recalling.
Viewing significant areas of constitutional law as entailing the
definition of excluded reasons suggests an approach to constitutionalism, not specific answers to particular problems. I have said little
about how courts might define the constitutional principles that structure different spheres, like education, political participation, science,
or religion. My claim, however, is that that interpretive task is more
central than "balancing" rhetoric suggests. Constitutional adjudication often principally involves the application of these definitions,
rather than any "balancing" of rights against state interests.
The excluded reasons approach is not, of course, sufficient to explain constitutional law; rights play many roles, and no doubt many
problems must continue to be understood to involve direct conflicts
between rights and state interests. But not all problems described in
these terms are, in fact, best understood this way. Instead, when
rights serve structural functions, as they often do, the task of courts is
to define the reasons excluded as permissible bases for state action.
Balancing, and the problems it raises, need not be part of that method.

